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Since the emergence of the classical school, the scientific ideal of physical sciences has 
been a constant influence on economic theory and method. Its influence is still present 
in contemporary neoclassical economics. Similarly to the case of physics, classical 
economists were very open in incorporating psychological elements in the economic 
discourse.  This openness towards psychology continued with prominent Marginalist 
economists, like Jevons and Edgeworth, who were eager to draw from psychological 
ideas found in earlier authors. In the first decades of the 20th century, a major conceptual 
change in economics took place which is also known as the Paretian turn. This 
conceptual change, initiated mainly by Vilfredo Pareto, and completed, in the first 
decades of the 20th century, by J. Hicks, R. Allen and P. Samuelson, attempted to 
remove all psychological notions from economic theory. The legacy of the Paretian turn 
can still be identified in the significant reluctance of the contemporary orthodox economic 
theory to incorporate the findings of the new behavioral economics, a field with a 
discernable psychological bent. This chapter argues that the history of the relation of 
those two subjects to economics can lead to some potentially useful observations 
concerning the nature of contemporary neoclassical economics. It will also be 
maintained that the relationship of neoclassical economics to physics ultimately 
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Since the emergence of the classical school, the scientific ideal of physical sciences has 
been a constant influence on economic theory and method. Examples of this influence 
can be found in the works of many leading classical economists. The classical physics 
model of science became more prevalent with the appearance of Marginalism. The 
economic thought of F.Y. Edgeworth, V. Pareto and I. Fisher shows that this trend 
continued with early neoclassical economics (Mirowski, 1989). Core components of 
contemporary mainstream methodology are also clearly influenced by the classical 
physics scientific method. The dominance of mathematical formalism, the conception 
of economics as a positive science, the complete separation of moral questions from the 
purpose of economics, and the emphasis on prediction, are indications of the influence 
of physics (Dow, 2002). 
Similarly to the case of physics, classical economists were very open in incorporating 
psychological elements in economic discourse.  The relevant work of authors such as 
J. Bentham, Adam Smith, N. Senior, J. Cairnes, James and John Stuart Mill, are 
indicative examples in this respect (Drakopoulos and Katselidis, 2019). The openness 
towards psychology continued with prominent marginalist economists like W. S. 
Jevons, F. Y. Edgeworth and P. Wicksteed who were eager to draw from psychological 
ideas found in earlier authors (Goodwin, 2016). Importantly, the incorporation of 
psychological ideas into economic theory laid the ground for the emergence of the 
systematic subjective theory of value which was mainly based on the specific 
framework of psychological hedonism. 
In general and up to the beginning of the 20th century, there was almost no 
methodological objection regarding the incorporation of ideas from psychology into 
economic theories. After this period however, a major conceptual change in economics 
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took place which is also known as the Paretian turn (Bruni and Sugden, 2007). This 
conceptual change, initiated mainly by Vilfredo Pareto and completed in the first 
decades of the 20th century by J. Hicks, R. Allen and P. Samuelson, attempted to 
expunge all psychological notions from economic theory (Lewin 1996; Frey and Benz 
2004; Hands 2010). The subsequent application of rational choice theory to most areas 
of economics such as public choice theory and labor economics, completed the Paretian 
turn of mainstream economics (Bruni and Sugden, 2007; Muramatsu, 2009).1 On the 
contrary, non-mainstream economists continued to incorporate ideas from psychology 
as the works of T. Veblen, J. M. Keynes, T. Scitovsky, H. Simon and others, indicate 
(Earl, 1990). 
Thus, although both physics and psychology had exerted a significant and continuous 
influence on the development of economic thought, the Paretian turn effectively halted 
any interaction with psychology. Additionally, the previous observations can be used 
in order to assess the significant resistance of contemporary neoclassical economic 
theory to accept the findings of the new behavioral economics (Earl, 2016). Therefore, 
the history of the relation of those two subjects to economics can lead to some 
potentially useful observations concerning the nature of contemporary neoclassical 
economics. It will be argued that the relationship of neoclassical economics to 
psychology is greatly determined by a specific conceptual framework with certain 
methodological features.  
 Accordingly, this chapter starts with a brief discussion of the history of the influence 
of physics on economic thought and continues with an examination of the presence of 
                                                          
1 The terms “mainstream” and “neoclassical economics” were identical at the time of the Paretian Turn. 
However, recent literature differentiates between the two, with neoclassical economics being part of, but 
not exhausting, mainstream economics, which now includes in addition to neoclassical economics, 
experimental economics, new behavioural economics, game theory etc. (Davis, 2006; Colander et al, 
2008; Morgan, ed. 2016). 
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psychological ideas in leading classical, marginalist and early neoclassical economists. 
Section four discusses the emergence and the completion of the Paretian turn which 
effectively severed the ties of economics to psychology. Section five focuses on some 
methodological issues arising from the previous discussion; namely, it discusses the 
negative neoclassical stance towards the rise of behavioral economics and the role of 
physics influence and formalism in determining the current methodological position of 
neoclassical economics towards psychological findings. A final section closes the 
paper. 
 
II. Physics as the Ideal Model of Scientific Inquiry 
 Classical Political Economy 
The great success of the 18th and especially 19th century physical sciences in explaining 
and predicting a wide range of physical phenomena gave these fields of study enormous 
status among the academic community and also among the general public.    Thus, it is 
not surprising that the physical science ideal was present even in the writings of many 
classical economists.  In Adam Smith’s History of Astronomy, the Newtonian system 
is viewed as the basic conceptual framework for the understanding of the natural world. 
In Smith’s view, the Newtonian method should be followed in every science whether 
moral or natural (Smith, 1983, pp. 126-34; see also Raphael, 1989; Schliesser, 2005). 
Another major classical economist, J.B. Say, distinguishes between descriptive 
sciences (e.g. botany and natural history) and experimental sciences (e.g. chemistry and 
natural philosophy). Descriptive sciences arrange and accurately designate the 
properties of certain objects. Experimental sciences unfold  the  reciprocal  action  of  
substances  on  each  other,  or  in  other  words,  the  connection between  cause  and  
effect. (Say, 1803, pp.17-18). Political Economy belongs to the experimental sciences  
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because it demonstrates  “the manner  in  which  events  take  place  in  relation  to  
wealth.” (Say, 1803, p.18).  
Jeremy Bentham, the founder of utilitarianism and a major source of inspiration for 
subsequent economic thought, strongly argued that the principle of utility could serve 
in social science the role that gravity plays in Newton’s model of the physical universe 
(Gordon, 1991, pp.251-253). In the same spirit, A. Comte provided the methodological 
justification for a unified social science. In Comte’s positivism, social sciences should 
study social phenomena in the same way that Astronomy, Mechanics, and Biology 
study astronomical, mechanical and biological phenomena (Bourdeau et al, 2018). 
Comte’s philosophy of positivism had substantial influence on the views of many post-
Ricardian authors concerning the nature and scope of economics. For instance, John 
Cairnes places Political Economy in the same class of sciences with Mechanics, 
Astronomy, Optics, Chemistry, and Electricity, and, in general, all those physical 
sciences which have reached the “deductive stage.” (Cairnes, 1875, p.35).  
J. S. Mill provided one of the first detailed analysis of the method of Political Economy. 
Although, Mill advocated a separate methodological approach for social sciences, the 
influence of Bentham and Comte is present in his methodological discussion. Mill 
believes that Physical sciences like Astronomy are exact sciences while economics like 
other social sciences is an inexact. According to Mill, economics is a science but it is 
not as exact as physical sciences (Hausman, 1992, pp.123-33). It is clear, that the 
physics ideal is present in his extensive analysis of the state and the method of 
economics as a science (see also Hollander, 2012).  
In general, the physical sciences were viewed by many classical economists as the way 
the new science of political economy should follow. It should be pointed out though, 
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that they did not adopt the mathematical formalism of physics or astronomy in the study 
of economic phenomena.  
Marginalism and Early Neoclassical Economics 
The emergence of marginalism in the 1870’s can arguably be described as a scientific 
revolution in the history of economic thought (e.g. Mirowski, 1984; Screpanti, and 
Zamagni, 2005; for an opposite view see Blaug, 1972, Meek, 1972).   The conceptual 
shift towards the subjective theory of value, the emphasis on demand-based analysis 
rather than on supply-based, the systematic use of mathematics, and the central role of 
the model of Homo Economicus, are the main elements which characterize the marginal 
school of economic thought. In spite of all those fundamental changes, the scientific 
ideal of physical sciences was a key common methodological element with the classical 
school. In fact, the endeavor to imitate the methods of physics became much more 
apparent with the emergence of the marginalist school. Further, the appeal to physical 
sciences provided the methodological justification for the increased use of mathematics 
observed in most marginalist works.  
One of the founders of the school, W. S. Jevons states that the theory of economy 
presents a close analogy to the science of statical mechanics (Jevons, 1871, p.viii). The 
same thesis is also presented in his subsequent  "Principles of Economics“,  where 
economic laws are conceived as universally valid like those of physical sciences 
(Jevons, 1905, p. 198). At the same period, L. Walras’ General Equilibrium Theory is 
the best example of the application of mathematical method in economics. Walras 
predicts that mathematical economics will rank with the mathematical sciences of 
astronomy and mechanics (Walras, [1871]1965ed, p.47, 48; see also Turk, 2012). 
Although he did not advocate the use of mathematics in economics, C. Menger also 
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thought that economics can be as exact science as the physical sciences (Menger, 1879, 
p.218).  
With the establishment of the marginalist school, the scientific ideal of physics was 
quite explicit in the writings of leading marginalists. In particular, F.Y. Edgeworth’s 
main work entitled Mathematical Psychics: An Essay of the Application of Mathematics 
to Moral Sciences (1881), represents the height of the physics emulation in the history 
of economic thought. It also sets the basis for the methodological justification of the 
use of mathematics in social sciences and especially in economics.  
According to Edgeworth, the first argument supporting the employment of the methods 
of mathematical physics to social science, is based on the assumption that every social 
phenomenon is the concomitant of a physical phenomenon. For instance, pleasure is 
the concomitant of energy (Edgeworth, 1881, p.9). Given the close connection of 
energy and pleasure, the maximization principle is easier to be accepted as a 
fundamental concept in economics. The second important reason for the application of 
mathematics to economics, is the quantitative nature of the discipline. Edgeworth 
argues that the lack of precise numerical data and exact functional relations in 
economics, is not an obstacle to the application of mathematical methods. He mentions 
the example of hydrodynamics where the available data is similar to economic data 
(Edgeworth, 1881, pp.4-5).   
The next figure who contributed to the formation of current ideas about method in 
economics was Irving Fisher who is considered to be one of the most important 
promoters of marginalism in America. For many historians, Fisher, accomplished the 
most thoroughgoing mathematization of marginalist theory (Breslau, 2003; 
Zouboulakis, 2003). The systematic introduction of mathematics into economic theory 
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was a conscious methodological position of imitating the methodology of classical 
physics.  As an illustration of the correspondence of physical and economic phenomena, 
Fisher built an elaborate hydraulic machine with pumps and levers, allowing him to 
demonstrate visually how the equilibrium prices in the market adjusted in response to 
changes in supply or demand (Fisher, 1892; Tobin, 1985).  
Phillip Wicksteed’s approach to economics combined the physics methodological ideal 
with the use of mathematics, albeit not to the same extent as in Jevons’ and Walras’ 
works. For instance, he compares the analysis of total and marginal utility to the 
projection of a body upwards at a given velocity (Wicksteed, 1888, pp. 2−15). In his 
other major work, Wicksteed (1910) continues the numerous analogies from physics, 
clearly implying that physics is the ideal model of scientific explanation.  
Physics and Neoclassical Economics 
After the strengthening of the physics ideal in the works of Edgeworth and Fisher, the 
increased formalization of economics continued with the seminal works of J. Hicks, R. 
Allen, P. Samuelson and J. von Neumann. Their main endeavor was to construct a 
mathematical economic theory so as to make it as ‘scientific’ as the hard sciences.  
Hicks and Allen provided a formal model of demand theory which was essentially 
based on marginalist concepts but was cast in a mathematical framework (Hicks and 
Allen, 1934). After a few years, the publication of Samuelson’s Foundations (1947) 
was also full of mathematical methods and tools used in physics. Samuelson adopted a 
conscious methodological stance to model economic analysis to physics.  Influenced 
by physicist Edwin Bidwell Wilson, Samuelson, thought that economics could use the 
same mathematics as physics without resting on the same empirical foundations and 
certainties (Samuelson, 1998, p.1376; Backhouse, 2015).  
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During the same period, John von Neumann’s work promoted further the development 
of mathematics in neoclassical economics. Just as the previous figures, he also 
advocated and strongly endorsed the use of the methods of physics for economic 
problems (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944, pp.3-7). In his writings, physics is 
always the benchmark for the state and the status of economics and he was confident 
that the achievement of the scientific status of physics is attainable and only a matter of 
time (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944, p.4).  
In one of the most influential essays on economic methodology, Milton Friedman 
(1953) reinforces the intellectual tradition of physics as a scientific ideal. It is 
suggestive that in this essay, Friedman also uses the analogy of physical sciences in his 
effort to construct the methodological basis of positive economics. In his view: 
 “Positive economics is, or can be, an ‘objective’ science, in precisely the same sense 
as any of the physical sciences.” (Friedman, 1953, p.4). 
The essay is full of analogies between economics and physics (Friedman, 1953, pp. 4, 
5, 10, 32, 36).  Although Friedman’s essay has been the subject of extensive criticism 
(see for instance, Mäki, 2009), it still shapes current perception concerning the method 
of neoclassical economics.   
In general and by the middle of the previous century, neoclassical economics had 
reached a high degree of formalism by employing mathematical methods and tools from 
physics (see also Ingrao and Israel, 1990; Weintraub, 2002). Nowadays, neoclassical 
economists do not explicitly refer to physics as their methodological ideal. The physics-
based conceptual tools of neoclassical analysis are taken as given and as fundamental 
components of neoclassical theory. Still, one can find influential works where the 
reference to physics is done intentionally in order to emphasize the scientific character 
of economics. E.  Lazear writes: 
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Economics is not only a social science, it is a genuine science. Like the physical 
sciences, economics uses a methodology that produces refutable implications and tests 
these implications using solid statistical techniques (Lazear, 2000, p.99). 
After stressing that the concept of equilibrium is central in economics as is also the case 
in the physical sciences, Lazear argues that economics is superior to other social 
sciences because “among social scientists, only economists insist on a physical-
sciences-style equilibrium as part of the analysis.” (Lazear, 2000, p.101). 
 
III. Psychological Ideas in Economics Discourse 
Contrary to the relationship between economics and physical science, the interaction 
between economics and psychology has many episodes in the history of both fields. 
Since the 18th century, economists have usually founded their own economic theories 
on some principles and ideas about human nature; accordingly, economics was not 
independent from psychological foundations. In fact, before and during the marginalist 
revolution, there were major authors who attempted to infuse psychological ideas and 
concepts into economics, and explicitly argued for the necessity of psychological 
reasoning. As will be seen in more detailed manner, these authors adopted many 
significant behavioral and psychological assumptions with respect to economic 
activities, opening the ground for future developments such as the emergence of 
behavioral and psychological economics. 
 
Classical Political Economy 
Adam Smith’s thought can be placed in the Scottish Enlightenment tradition. In this 
conceptual framework, the view of science (which developed mainly under the 
influence of Hume), was that the study of human nature should be central. Thus, 
political economy was understood in terms of philosophy and history, and also it was 
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not seen as separable from the other emerging social sciences (Dow et al 1997, pp.371-
373).  Thus, it was not surprising that Adam Smith in his Theory of Moral Sentiments 
(1759), dealt extensively with the psychological aspects of choice.2 It is also well-
known that in the Wealth of Nations, he regarded self-interest and self-love as the 
fundamental motives of human motivation and action. However, in his Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, by recognizing the plurality of human incentives, he emphasizes the 
pleasure of mutual sympathy (Smith, 1759, p.4). Smith’s interest in the influence of 
emotion and sentiment on socio-psychological motivation, “foreshadows a number of 
areas in modern behavioral economics, particularly models of social influence” 
(Baddeley, 2013). Furthermore, what is now referred to as ‘psychological’ was Adam 
Smith’s explanation for the motivation for science and the spread of ideas (Dow, 2010). 
The strong tradition of analyzing the psychological elements of human nature continued 
in the work of Jeremy Bentham. With the spread of Bentham's utilitarianism, the 
hedonistic psychology entered economic thinking in a systematic way.  Bentham puts 
pain and pleasure at the center of human action which is the basic principle of 
psychological hedonism (Bentham 1823, p.1). As he states: “They [pleasure and pain] 
govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw 
off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it.” (Bentham 1823, p.1). 
The influence of Bentham’s thought on subsequent economists was great. The first 
economists to be influenced by his ideas were the representatives of the late period of 
the classical school. N. Senior, James and John Stuart Mill, and J. E. Cairnes were the 
most renowned classical economists who followed the basic principles of Bentham’s 
utilitarianism. 
                                                          
2 Among the features of the Scottish political economy tradition as summarised in Dow (1987) was the 
recognition of the sociological and psychological aspects of theory appraisal. 
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Nassau Senior was very conscious of the psychological bases of economic behavior. 
He stressed that in order to explain economic behavior we should first examine the 
various principles and motives that shape human economic action. According to Senior, 
“the desire for wealth” is considered as the fundamental human motive, since it is “the 
cornerstone of the doctrine of wages and profits, and, generally speaking, of exchange. 
In short, it is in Political Economy what gravitation is in Physics” (Senior, 1836, p. 28; 
see also Karayiannis, 2001).  
James Mill, influenced by Hume, Hartley and Thomas Brown and by associationist 
psychology, argued that the mind is made of only sensations and ideas held together by 
contiguity (Mill, 1829/1869). Similarly, “for Mill, the mind consisted of mental 
elements held together by the laws of association; therefore, mental experience was as 
predictable as physical events.” (Hergenhahn, 2009, p.154).  Furthermore, both James 
and John Stuart Mill were influenced by Bentham’s utilitarian principles. It is indicative 
that J. S. Mill describes political economy as a moral or psychological science and 
defines it as “the science relating to the moral or psychological laws of the production 
and distribution of wealth.” (Mill, 1844, p.129, 133) 
Apart from the major authors discussed so far, the psychological bases of economic 
behavior were a subject that captured the interest of many other significant figures of 
the classical school. R. Whately, M. Longfield, T. Banfield, R. Jennings and J. Cairnes 
were some of those figures (see Drakopoulos and Katselidis, 2019),     
Psychological Ideas in Marginalists and Early Neoclassicals  
 
As was noted before, a subjective theory of value followed by the gradual formation of 
a model of individual economic behavior (Homo Economicus), was a key characteristic 
of the marginal school.  The shift towards a utility based theory of value did not emerge 
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in vacuum, but it was clearly connected to the psychological ideas found in many 
classical and pre-marginalist economists. In marginalism, the concept of marginal 
utility was central in the theory of value along with the selfish maximization of pleasure 
or satisfaction. Most leading marginalists explicitly acknowledged the philosophy and 
psychology of Benthamite hedonism as their main influence. In this respect, the 
incorporation of ideas from other intellectual areas was considered methodologically 
valid and desirable.  
One of the protagonists of the first marginalist generation, W. S. Jevons openly admits 
the influence of utilitarianism when in the introduction of his main work states: “I have 
no hesitation in accepting the Utilitarian theory of morals” (Jevons, 1871, p.27). 
Furthermore, Jevons’ well-known definition of economics in terms of calculus of 
pleasure and pain indicates his emphasis on psychological sensations.  In a similar vein, 
Walras conceives all land-owners, workers, and capitalists as pleasure maximizers 
(Walras 1874, 42-43). Finally, Menger thought that the object of economic research 
was to discover those laws governing market phenomena which can be traced back to 
their ultimate genetic determinants in man’s physiological, psychological and social 
nature (Jaffe 1976, p.522). 
In his attempt to construct a theory of “psychophysics”, F.Y. Edgeworth was keen to 
incorporate psychological ideas in economic analysis. Similarly to Jevons, 
psychological hedonism was the underlying framework in Edgeworth’s most important 
work (Edgeworth, 1881). Edgeworth viewed psychological phenomena as a legitimate 
field for the application of mathematical tools, like, for instance, his willingness to link 
“hedonic calculus” from psychophysics to “utilitarian calculus” in economics. The aim 
of a unified science of physical and mental phenomena can be found in his notion of 
“psychophysics” (for a detailed discussion, see Drakopoulos and Katselidis, 2015).  
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Wicksteed’s main methodological concern was to construct an economic theory free 
from non-scientific elements. His misgivings about the obvious role of hedonism in 
marginalist formulations led him to deliberately downplay marginalism’s hedonistic 
underpinnings (see Drakopoulos, 2011). However, he supported the methodological 
view of incorporating findings from psychology into economics: ‘the psychological law 
that dominates economics dominates life’ (Wicksteed, 1894, p. 780).     Moreover, he 
believed that all psychological considerations that bear upon the production and 
distribution of wealth must be included in economics if it is to become a positive science 
(Wicksteed, 1894). It must be emphasized here that for Wicksteed, psychology was a 
legitimate scientific discipline, and he therefore saw no obstacle to economics using its 
concepts and findings.3  
IV. The Emergence and the Completion of the Paretian Turn 
Edgeworth’s work can be viewed as the peak of the interaction between economics and 
ideas from psychology after the marginalist revolution. However, in the closing decades 
of the nineteenth century when the second marginalist generation of economists 
emerged, the influence of positivism as the dominant scientific philosophy became 
much more prevalent (Dow, 2002). One of the basic tenets of positivism was that the 
enormous success of the physical sciences meant that their scientific methodology 
should also be followed by the other disciplines (methodological individualism). The 
application of the methodology of physical sciences to economics, called for the 
rejection of all normative, ethical or metaphysical elements (for a discussion, see 
Mirowski, 1989; Dow, 2002, pp.170–175). Due to the influence of positivism, 
                                                          
3 It is interesting to note that John Neville Keynes writing during the same period, also has a positive 
attitude towards psychology. In his view, political economy “presupposes psychology just as it 
presupposes the physical sciences.” (Keynes, 1890, p.46).  
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psychological elements were also considered as value-laden and therefore unacceptable 
for the corpus of economic theory (see also Coats, 1976; Lewin, 1996). The important 
consequence of this methodological stance was that many leading economists of the 
period became indifferent – or even hostile to the findings of other social sciences, and 
especially to psychological theories.  
Vilfredo Pareto was extremely influenced by the prevailing positivist scientific 
philosophy. His methodological ideal for the discipline of economics was that it should 
be a mathematical science, part of the natural sciences such as physiology and 
chemistry (Pareto, 1896, p. 21). In the spirit of positivism, this required that economics 
should be freed from any philosophical or psychological notions that hamper the 
application of the positivist methodology4. In the same conceptual tradition, Pareto 
believed that the construction of the fictional model of economic man was adequate for 
the needs of economic theory, thus clearly implying that psychological findings are not 
necessary (Pareto, 1907; see also Bruni and Guala, 2001; Bruni, 2010). 
Similarly to Pareto, Fisher was against the inclusion of psychological concepts in 
economics. Fisher thought of psychology as a “soft” subject not worthy for 
consideration by the “hard” science of economics. In this sense, the following statement 
is indicative: “But the economist need not envelope his own science in the hazes of 
ethics, psychology, biology and metaphysics” (Fisher, 1892, p. 23). 
The negative attitude towards psychology was further promoted by L. Robbins’ 
influential methodological work in which he supported the view that psychology ought 
to be kept out of economic analysis (Robbins, 1932, pp.83–84). Regarding the 
theoretical developments, Pareto’s and Fisher’s anti-psychology stance resulted in the 
                                                          
4 For an extensive discussion, see Drakopoulos, 1997. 
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reformulation of consumer theory as an allegedly psychology-free theoretical 
construction. The reformulation was completed in the works of Hicks, Allen, and 
Samuelson, and mainstream economics expelled (at least nominally) any psychological 
and sociological notions found in earlier marginalist writings (see also Bruni and 
Sugden, 2007; Hands, 2010). For instance, the main intention of Samuelson’s revealed 
preference theory was to dismiss the alleged psychological concepts of utility theory 
(Samuelson, 1938; 1947). The tendency to ignore concepts and findings from other 
social sciences and especially from psychology, continued in the post war era. It was 
also strengthened by the rise of   logical positivism — the modern version of nineteenth 
century positivism — which became very popular among the vast majority of 
mainstream economists (Redman, 1993). The influential paper by Stigler and Becker 
(1977), where they claimed that preference theory can free economics of any need to 
turn to other disciplines such as psychology, is a representative example of this trend.  
The new concept of psychology-free economic rationality would also form the basis of 
the general equilibrium model that emerged during the same period (Arrow and Debreu, 
1954; Arrow and Hahn, 1971). The extension of economic rationality in the form of 
axiomatic expected utility theory in the works of John von Neumann, Oscar 
Morgenstern, and Leonard Savage was also in the spirit of independence of any psychic 
state (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Savage, 1954). In the middle of the 
twentieth century, Milton Friedman’s (1953) essay on economic methodology can also 
be viewed as an effort to shield the rationality assumption from criticism mainly 
originating from psychological research (see also Düppe, 2011). In Friedman’s opinion, 
psychological assumptions were largely irrelevant to the validation of theories (see also 
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Sent, 2004; Muramatsu, 2009).5 These developments completed the Paretian turn of 
mainstream economics. Although for a long period in the history of economic thought 
economists were open to incorporate ideas and concepts from both physics and 
psychology, the establishment of mainstream economics severed the ties to psychology. 
V. Methodological Issues 
Psychology and Behavioral Economics 
The Paretian turn was largely responsible for the break of the long tradition of the 
interaction between economics and psychology in the framework of mainstream 
economics. However, non-mainstream economists continued to draw upon  
psychological concepts, also as part of the criticism of the standard model of economic 
rationality.  Thus and long before the emergence of behavioral economics as a distinct 
discipline, Herbert Simon criticized the mainstream model of “Homo Economicus” 
from a psychological viewpoint. By focusing on the behavioral and cognitive processes 
of humans making decisions, Simon argued that the conception of economic man as a 
lighting calculator of costs and benefits is unrealistic. The important repercussion of 
Simon’s approach was the challenge of the established model of economic rationality.  
(Simon, 1955; 1979).6  
Apart from undermining the standard approach to economic rationality, Simon’s work 
provided the stimulus for further examination of the psychological basis of economic 
behavior. Thus, in the late 1970s, the theoretical and empirical validity of neoclassical 
economic rationality as expressed in the expected utility theory, started to be questioned 
                                                          
5 Friedman’s negative stance towards psychology was also the basic reason for his rejection of 
Duesenberry’s “psychology based” consumption function (Mason, 2000). 




further by psychologists Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, and Paul Slovic 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982).  These works 
are considered to have given the stimulus for the emergence of new behavioral 
economics (as opposed to old behavioral economics stemming mainly from the work 
of Simon). New Behavioral economics can be viewed as a systematic attempt towards 
the revival of psychological ideas in economic analysis (Sent, 2004). Kahneman and 
Tversky’s approach had a strong orientation towards psychology and many key ideas 
found in new behavioral economics were stimulated by psychological literature.  
Notions such as reference dependence, loss aversion, adaptation, endowment effects, 
and framing effects are commonplace in modern behavioral economics (see Rabin, 
2002). For instance, Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt acknowledge that their work 
concerning fairness is connected to the relevant psychological theories: “Our theory is 
motivated by the psychological evidence on social comparison and loss aversion” (Fehr 
and Schmidt, 1999, p. 856). Furthermore, some of the more recent models originating 
from the new behavioral economics draw on explicitly from findings from neuroscience 
and cognitive psychology (e.g. Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec, 2005; for a detailed 
discussion, see also Muramatsu, 2009).  
It has to be noted though, that the new behavioral economics do not challenge the 
standard model of economic rationality. Instead, “the realism of the psychology 
underlying economic analysis will improve the field of economics on its own terms—
generating theoretical insights, making better predictions of field phenomena, and 
suggesting better policy.” (Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004, p.3). In the same vein, R. 
Thaler rejects the notion that behavioral economics was a revolution in economics and 
views it as one part of the growing importance of the empirical work in economics 
(Thaler, 2016).  In general though, new behavioral economics represents the main 
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manifestation of the current revival of the interaction between economics and 
psychology. 
 
The Legacy of the Paretian Turn  
Regardless of the increasing presence of new behavioral economics, the negative 
attitude towards importing psychology into economics is still prevalent among 
neoclassical economists. There are a number of arguments which have been suggested 
against the ‘psychology inclined’ behavioral economics.  One view asserts that 
behavioral findings which undermine the standard model are of little interest, since they 
correspond to deviations from the rational behavior, and therefore only describe the 
mistakes the individual can make during this process of “rationalisation” (Binmore, 
1999). Another approach rejects the criticisms of the rational choice theory by lab 
experiments contacted by behavioral economists. According to this view “there are 
many reasons to suspect that these laboratory findings might fail to generalize to real 
markets.” (Levitt and List, 2008, p.910). Furthermore, it is suggested that agents behave 
far more selfishly in natural settings than in lab experiments (Levitt and List, 2008, p. 
909). 
The leading neoclassical economist David Levine focuses on the methodological 
foundations of behavioral economics.  Levine strongly rejects the criticism of the 
standard theory by behavioral economists. He argues that the connection of behavioral 
economics to psychology and neuroscience is doomed to fail because the goals of 
psychologists and economists are different, and that this has implications for importing 
ideas from psychology into economics (Levine, 2012, p.125). In the same vein, the 
distinguished philosopher of economics Don Ross argues that economics and 
psychology are fundamentally distinct disciplines with different methodologies, and 
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therefore he “rejects the call voiced by some behavioral economists for a revolution in 
the main methodology of economic modelling and data analysis.” (Ross, 2014, pp. 19-
20).  In general and in spite of the rise of new behavioral economics, there are strong 
objections by neoclassical economists to incorporate psychological research into 
economic theory. 
Physics, Formalism and Psychology 
A number of specialists in economic methodology have maintained that the physics-
based mathematical method has become the dominant ideology in the economics 
academy (e.g. Elster, 2009; Lawson, 2012). In particular and according to Tony 
Lawson, this ideology consists of “…the extraordinarily widespread and long-lasting 
belief that mathematical modelling is somehow neutral at the level of content or form, 
but an essential method for science, underpinning any proper or serious economics.” 
(Lawson, 2012, p.17). In the case of the relationship between economics and 
psychology, the stance of neoclassical economics towards psychology is still shaped by 
the Paretian turn. One can argue that the Paretian turn was the result of the 
consolidation of mainstream economic methodology: the physics ideal and the ensuing   
mathematical formalism provided the methodological framework for the establishment 
of rational choice model7. Due to the legacy of the Paretian turn, this model is 
conceived as having no psychological basis, thus isolating neoclassical economics from 
any meaningful interaction with psychology.  
In this framework, one can understand better the failure of Simon’s psychological 
approach to influence standard economic theory (see also Dow, 2010). Similarly, the 
                                                          
7 It should be noted here that since the mid20th century, the meaning of the term formalism has been 
associated with the triumph of form over substance rather than the mere use of mathematics (Blaug, 
1999). In addition, its modern use has to do with the increasing influence of axiomatic approach in 
economics as was also the case in the field of mathematics (Ingrao and Israel, 1990; Weintraub and 
Mirowski, 1994).  For an analysis of the changing meaning of the tem formalism, see Milonakis, 2017.    
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empirical challenge of experimental results supplied mainly by new behavioral 
economists, have failed to make substantial inroads into neoclassical theory (see also 
Rabin, 2002). As Sheila Dow notes:   
The empirical results of experimental economics at times seem to falsify key elements 
of pure theory in mainstream economics. Yet, amending theory in order to take this into 
account, particularly with input from psychology, has run up against the strictures of 
mathematical formalism. (Dow, 2013, p.27) 
 
The firmly established conviction of psychology-free economic theory can also be seen 
as an explanation of the relative failure of the new behavioral economics to infuse 
psychological concepts into neoclassical economic theory. This is despite the fact that 
the new behavioral economics does not challenge the basic tenets of the standard model 
of economic rationality (Sent, 2004). The established methodological framework can 
also explain the denial to consider the rich contributions of psychological insights of 
many leading non-mainstream economists. The examples of T. Veblen, J. M. Keynes, 
T. Scitovsky, and H. Simon are indicative (for discussions see Fiori, 2011; Pugno, 2014; 
Goodwin, 2016). The common methodological point of these heterodox approaches is 
the rejection of the standard model of economic rationality. The abandonment of this 
narrow framework inevitably allows the presence of psychological notions. As Sheila 
Dow aptly observes:  
But if we depart from the formal requirements of models of optimisation subject to 
constraints, then a richer notion of psychology, and an integration of cognitive and 
emotional factors, are possible. (Dow, 2010, p.260) 
In sum, the epistemology of neoclassical economics is the key for the understanding of 
its negative attitude towards psychological ideas.   
 VI. Concluding Comments 
The history of the relationship between physics and economics indicates that since the 
classical school, physics exercised a very significant influence on the formation of 
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economic theory and method. The height of this influence was reached with the 
emergence of marginalism and of early neoclassical economics. The gradual 
dominance of mathematical formalism, the conception of economics as an exact, 
positive science, the positive-normative distinction, and the emphasis on prediction, 
cannot be comprehended without taking into consideration the influence of classical 
physics. As was seen, contemporary neoclassical economic theory and method still 
acknowledge their intellectual affinity to physical sciences. 
On the contrary, the history of the relationship between economics and psychology has 
followed a different route. The willingness of classical economists to incorporate 
psychological ideas was evident. The same observation can be made about the founders 
of marginalism who often appealed to psychology in order to support the subjective 
theory of value and also to build a theory of individual economic behavior. Early 
neoclassicals such as Edgeworth and Wicksteed were also supporters of drawing from 
psychology. However, the course changed with the emergence of the Paretian turn. 
Initiated mainly by Pareto and completed in the first decades of the 20th century, 
psychological ideas were deemed to be unnecessary for economic theory. The 
expulsion of psychology was completed by the influential works of Samuelson and 
Friedman.  
Thus, the relative long tradition of drawing from psychology came to a halt with the 
establishment of mainstream economics by the mid20th century. Psychology was 
increasingly viewed as being subjective and ambiguous and therefore unscientific. In 
contrast, physics continued to be held at high esteem and viewed as a methodological 
model for economics. The rise of behavioral economics (and especially of the new 
behavioral economics), with its strong psychological bent, did not end the isolation of 
economics from psychology. Contemporary neoclassical economic theory is still very 
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reluctant to allow psychological findings in the core of the theory. The main reason for 
this, is the dominant methodological framework which is still largely shaped by the 
lasting influence of the classical physics ideal. Our discussion indicates that the 
relationship of mainstream economics to physics ultimately constrained its interaction 
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